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Plato’s Prime Mover Argument 
 
 
 
Plato, Laws, Book X 
 
In Book X Plato considers murder and other acts of violence - acts one might 
think the gods would dislike and usually punish. Here the ‘Athenian Stranger’ 
(presumably, by and large, speaking for Plato) says that people who do this 
sort of thing either (1) believe that the gods do not exist, or (2) believe that if 
they do exist, they don’t take care of us, or (3) believe that sacrifices and 
prayers easily appease the gods. The Athenian thinks that these dangerous 
people are aided and abetted by confused, foolish, materialistic, atheistic 
philosophers. What we need in opposition to this whole nasty crowd is 
substantial evidence that the gods really exist, are far too good to accept 
bribes, and are not easily appeased. 
 
Cleinias and Megillus urge the Athenian to produce this evidence. 
 
[Cleinias   …… from Crete 
 
Megillus    …  from Sparta, doesn’t talk much.] 
 
 
In this paper I neglect the second and third task and consider only the first.  
 
The Athenian accepts the challenge, and, after a brief prayer for inspiration, 
begins by pretending that someone has said: 
 
“O stranger are all things at rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact 
opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?”  
To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others at rest. 
(893b) 
 
 
What follows is a more or less incomprehensible description of eight different 
kinds of ‘motion’ in a fairly broad sense. Here I substitute a list provided (I 
suppose) by R. G. Bury in the Loeb Classical Library edition of Laws Vol. II, 
Book X, pp. 328-9 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Circular motion round a fixed centre. 
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(2)  Locomotion (gliding or rolling) 
 
(3) Combination 
 
(4) Separation 
 
(5) Increase 
 
(6) Decrease 
 
(7) Becoming 
 
(8) Perishing 
 
(9) Other-affecting motion 
 
(10)  Self-and-other-affecting motion 
 
 
 
 
The interesting ‘motions’ are those last two. Expanding them a bit we get: 
 
(9’) x is able to move other things and be moved by other 
things, but is not able to move itself. (Think of a passenger car 
near the middle of a long train. When the train moves forward, 
the car is pulled by the car in front of it and pulls the car 
behind it.) 
 
(10’) x is able to move other things, and able to move itself.1 
Presumably it can do this without being moved by anything 
other than itself. (Think of a horse pulling a wagon.) 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
1 Thomas Aquinas offers a 'proof’ that everything, which is in motion, is moved by something else. (See. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book one: God, translated by Anton C. Pegis. Pp. 86-88.) 
Anthony Kenny, in The Five Ways, p. 13 says that this ‘proof’ is borrowed from Aristotle, and Aquinas 
says the same thing. No doubt they are right. But Aristotle’s own view on this matter seems less 
straightforward. In Physics, Bk. VIII: Ch 3, 254b Aristotle says: “Of things to which the motion is essential 
some derive their motion from themselves, others from something else.” {The basic Works of Aristotle, 
Richard Mc Keon, p. 363} Kenny himself points out that, according to Aristotle, animals move themselves. 
(Kenny, p. 14.) On the other hand, Aristotle provides an elaborate discussion of animal movement, which 
seems to show that in every such case a non-moving part of the animal imparts motion to a moving part. 
(See Physics, book VIII, Ch 5, McKeon, pp. 372-3.) (Aquinas, of course, believes that the bodies of 
animals are moved by something other than their bodies, namely their souls.)  
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Athenian: ….. which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being 
the mightiest and most efficient? 
 
Cleinias: I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten 
thousand times superior to all the others.2 
 
 
Athenian: Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I 
have been saying? 
 
Cleinias: What are they? 
 
Athenian: When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite 
correct. 
 
Cleinias: What was the error? 
 
Athenian: According to the true order, the tenth was really the first in 
generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely 
enough termed the ninth by us. 
 
Cleinias: What do you mean? 
 
Athenian: I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that 
another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can 
a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? 
Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again 
other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in 
motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the 
self-moving principle? 
 
Cleinias: Very true, and I quite agree. (894c – 895a) 
 
 
Some early worries 
 
Isn’t there is a missing premise or two? Plato seems to be assuming that there 
must have been a beginning – the first movement of at least one thing. But 
why must this have been the case? Couldn’t there have been a universe full of 
activity that had no beginning – that always existed in one form or another?3 
Some versions of the ‘prime mover’ argument include defense of the claim 
that the universe must have had a beginning.)  
                                                       
2 In the Timaeus Plato says: “…as concerns the motions, the best motion of a body is that caused by itself 
in itself; for this is most nearly akin to the motions of intelligence and the motion of the Universe. Motion 
due to the agency of another is less good;” 89 A. Loeb Classical Library, Plato VII. Here it sounds as 
though the motion of the body was caused by the body. But this, apparently, is not Plato’s view.  
 
3 This was Aristotle’s view. 
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Where did the initial assemblage of motionless atoms come from? It looks as 
though it must have always existed or have had a beginning earlier than the 
first movement. If it had a beginning, what brought that about? 
 
The line of argument here is intended as an attack on physicalists like 
Democritus who, presumably think that in the beginning there was just a big 
assemblage of motionless stuff. Is the argument meant to be a reductio ad 
absurdum of this assumption? I don’t think this is they way the argument is 
supposed to go. It looks to me as though Plato really thinks that ‘life’, ‘self-
movement,’ ‘soul’, created the world, or, at least, set it in motion. 
 
Athenian: If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, 
all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned 
principles of motion must necessarily be the first to spring up among 
them?4 Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them 
arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in 
themselves. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all 
motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as 
among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of 
change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is 
second. 
 
Cleinias: Quite true. (895 a – b) 
 
 
 
It’s a bit difficult to follow the Athenian’s line of thought. One is inclined to 
think that he does not endorse the idea that initially all of the elementary 
particles were motionless. 
 
As it turns out, the Athenian holds that self-movement is “the first origin and 
moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be..” (896b) Hence, he 
seems to hold that, in the beginning, all the particles were motionless and 
then suddenly, in at least one particle, self-movement sprang into being.  
Given the set up, it is not at all clear why he thinks this must be the way it 
was.  Why should all of the particles have been motionless initially?  
What suddenly caused there to be a capacity for self-movement in at least one 
particle, or had that capacity always existed? How long had those particles 
been sitting there in a ‘mass’ before the first movement?  If for some finite 
length of time then the first ‘movement’ was not the voluntary movement of 
some particle or group of particles. It was the coming into being of the mass.  
 
 
Another (rather stupid sounding) question. When there is self-movement, 
what gets moved? Here is one possibility: If some physical object, say a 
magical billiard ball, has the capacity of self-movement, then it can, for 
instance roll itself, set itself in motion. It is the billiard ball that gets moved.  
                                                       
. 
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(It doesn’t make much sense to say the capacity itself is moved or moves 
itself.) 
 
 
Lots of little worries here. But things get worse.  
 
 
Athenian: At this stage of the argument let us put a question. 
 
Cleinias: What question? 
 
Athenian: If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or 
fiery substance simple or compound – how should we describe it? 
 
Cleinias: You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving 
power life? 
 
Athenian: I do. 
 
Cleinias: Certainly we should. 
 
Athenian: And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same 
– must we not admit that this is life? 
 
Cleinias: We must. (895c ) 
 
 
The Athenian is claiming that having a soul is equivalent to having life (being 
alive) and that having the ability to move itself is equivalent to having life. The 
conclusion is that having a soul is equivalent to having the ability to move 
itself. (896a).  
 
I take it we now know that some non-living things move themselves. 
Molecules dart around, or jiggle. Atoms do the same thing. Electrons zip 
along at incredible speeds. A bold defender of Plato’s physics might insist that 
these little entities are ‘alive’  - have or are little tiny ‘souls.’ But this is not the 
accepted view among present day physicists. 
  
Presumably, then, we do not identify self-movement with life. Molecules, 
atoms and electrons are self-movers but, so far as we know, they do not have 
souls and are not living things. 
 
Cleinias: You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-
moved is the same with that which has the name ‘soul’? 
 
Athenian: Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is 
anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and 
moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their 
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contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change 
and motion in all things? (896 a) 
 
 
 
 
Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle 
 
 
Aquinas held that Aristotle had proved that everything that is moved is 
moved by another.5 That is to say, in regard to anything, x, if x is moved then 
there is a y such that x is not y, and x is moved by y.  
{Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur.} He rejects the idea that living 
creatures can move themselves. (Presumably their souls move their bodies.)  
 
 
If Alice is able to ‘move herself’ (as we say), must she be something other than 
that which gets moved? 
 
 
It seems to me that the ability to move itself (or one’s self) is not something 
that can cause movement. (I know this sounds weird.)  The ability to draw 
pictures is not something that can draw pictures, or that can cause pictures to 
be drawn. The ability enables, or allows, the person to draw.  
 
 
In addition, as I have said, we now know that the ability to move itself is 
something distinct from life, and from soul. Atoms are self-moving; but they 
are not alive, and do not have souls. 
 
 
Three ways to go: 
 
(1) The ‘movement that moves itself’ designates soul. It is this that 
enters the fetus’s body at the ‘quickening.’ It is an entity, not just 
a capacity or ability. Soul moves the fetus’s body. Or:  
(2) The ‘movement that moves itself’ is the ability of a living thing, 
e.g. a frog, to move itself. (It is the frog that produces the frog’s 
movement – e.g. the jump.) Or: 
(3) There is no such thing as the movement that moves itself. Omne 
quod movetur, ab alio movetur.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
5 See Saint Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God, Translated by Anton C. Pegis, p. 86. 
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Aquinas accepts (3). Plato accepts (1).  
 
 
 
 
Back to Plato 
 
 
Athenian:  … what is the definition of that which is named ‘soul’? Can 
we conceive of any other than that which has been already given – the 
motion which can move itself? 
 
Cleinias: You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-
moved is the same with that which has the name soul? 
 
Atheian: Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is 
anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and 
moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their 
contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change 
and motion in all things? 
 
Cleinias: Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion has been 
most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. (895e – 896b) 
 
 
Here the argument seems to move too rapidly. We began with a mass of 
particles. (There was no hint that these particles must have been created or 
arranged by soul.) Then, presumably, at least one particle became able to 
move itself, dashed off and collided violently with several other particles 
setting off a cascade of motion. The eventual result was the universe as we see 
it today.  
 
Nothing in this account forces us to hold that there are souls, or that soul, or 
the motion that moves itself, is the first origin and moving power of all that is. 
 
A bit later the Athenian says: 
 
…. As soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, 
must we not say that she orders the heavens? 
 
Cleinias: Of course. 
 
Athenian: One soul or more? – I will answer for you; at any rate we 
must not suppose that there are less than two – one the author of good, 
and the other of evil.  
 
Cleinias: Very true. (896d- e) 
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Like most well educated people in his day, Plato thought that the sun and the 
moon circle around a stationary spherical earth. At a further distance and at 
considerable speed, the sphere of the stars revolves. He also believed that all 
of this motion is ‘ordered’ by at least two souls, one good and the other bad.  
 
 
 
Consider the sun.  
 
Athenian: Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, 
resides within the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries 
us about every way; or the soul provides herself with a body of fire or 
air, as some affirm, and from some point without violently propels 
body by body; or thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun 
by some extraordinary and wonderful power. [898e -899] 
 
In any case, according to Plato, the sun’s soul should be regarded as a god (or 
goddess?). 
 
Athenian: And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and 
months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul 
or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, 
those souls are gods, whether they are living beings and reside in 
bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the 
place and mode of their existence; - and will anyone who admits all this 
tolerate the denial that all things are full of gods? 
 
Cleinias: No one, stranger, would be such a madman. [899b-c] 
 
 
Plato offers us a magical little universe; but, unfortunately, the slide from the 
‘motion that moves itself’ to the existence of the gods is illicit and unjustified. 
Those of us who hold that living things are, in general, capable of moving 
themselves (in a broad sense of ‘moving’ that includes growth) are not thereby 
committed to the view that all living things have souls, nor to any form of 
polytheism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
